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1.  Introduction  
The instrumental case for girls‘ education is often regarded as too compelling to require 
argumentation.  There  are  several  weighty  testimonies  in  its  favour.  These  comprise  the 
importance ascribed to  girls‘ education in economic growth (Abu-Ghaida and Klasen, 2004; 
Birdsall, Ross and Sabot, 1993), the significance of female education in improving both market 
productivity and valued non-market outcomes such as health, nutrition, longevity, fertility and 
child learning outcomes (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001; Schultz, 2002; McMahon, 2002; King 
and Hill, 1993) and, probably reflecting these, the inclusion of gender equality in education as 
one of the eight Millennium Development Goals. Investing in girls‘ education has been hailed as 
possibly the highest return investment available in a developing country (World Bank, 1994). 
Despite these advantages, however, girls continue to face inferior educational opportunities in 
many parts of the world, including historically in India.  
If girls have inferior educational outcomes vis-à-vis boys this could be due to gender bias 
in the schooling system, or due to pro-male gender discrimination in the labour market reducing 
girls‘ incentive for schooling. An alternative and potentially powerful explanation could also be 
parental pro-male bias in education manifested in lower intra-household educational expenditure 
on girls than boys.  
Previous work on gender differentials in within-family education expenditure allocation 
in India (Subramanian and Deaton, 1991, using National Sample Survey data for year 1983) 
finds evidence of pro-male bias in rural Maharashtra in the 10–14 year age group. Lancaster, 
Maitra and Ray (2008) use similar data for ten years later and also find significant pro-male bias 




Maharashtra. Such biases are not found for urban areas or for primary school children aged 6 to 
9.  While  Subramanian  and  Deaton  concentrate  on  only  one  Indian  state  (Maharashtra), 
Lancaster, Maitra and Ray‘s sample is restricted to four Indian states: Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, 
Kerala,  and  Maharashtra.  In  addition,  both  of  these  studies  use  household-level  data  on  the 
budget share of education in total household expenditure. Kingdon (2005) uses individual-level 
education expenditure data from rural India referring to 1993. She finds pro-male bias in the 
household decision to enroll (or not enroll) children in school, but no evidence of gender bias in 
education expenditure conditional on enrolling both girls and boys in school. She argues that any 
gender bias in education within the household can potentially occur in two different decisions : 
(a) the decision of whether to enroll/retain both sons and daughters in school and, (b) conditional 
on enrolling both genders, the decision of how much to spend on their schooling. She concludes 
that a plausible explanation why previous studies did not find intra-household gender bias in 
education  expenditure  allocation  is  because  they  model  the  enrolment  and  conditional 
expenditure decisions together; since there is pro-male bias in the enrolment decision and no bias 
(or even a slight pro-female bias) in the conditional education expenditure decision, averaging 
across  these  decisions  leads  to  a  failure  to  detect  overall  gender  bias  that  does  exist  in  the 
positive education expenditure (enrolment) decision.  
However, Kingdon used data from 1993 and since then the liberalization of the Indian 
economy led to rapid economic growth, reduced poverty and greatly increased school enrolment 
rates. As such, the gender gap in education outcomes is likely to have fallen. Secondly, Kingdon 
had household expenditure data only on food, health and education rather than total household 
expenditure. Thus, it worked with the education budget sub-share rather than with education 




analysis of bias in rural areas only as her data were exclusively rural. The data used in this paper 
are from both urban and rural areas. We revisit the issue of the intra-household allocation of 
expenditure  with  a  new  data  set  collected  in  2004-05.  We  are  able  to:  use  better  data,  test 
whether there exists bias in urban areas, and ask whether the extent and nature of intra-household 
gender bias changed between 1993 and 2005 in rural India.  
The findings of the paper are as follows. First, there is imperfect correspondence between 
the results using household-level data and those using individual-level data. We do find evidence 
of gender-bias in some states using the household-level data and the traditional Engel method; 
however,  using  the  same  methodology  with  individual  child-level  data  helps  us  to  unravel 
gender-bias in many more states. Second, unpacking education expenditure decisions into two 
parts—a) the decision to enroll in a school, and b) the decision to how much to spend conditional 
on enrolling—provides additional insights into gender bias since in many states the direction of 
observed  gender  bias  is  opposite  in  the  two  decisions.  Third,  significant  progress  in  gender 
equality in education has been achieved in rural India between 1993 and 2005: the incidence of 
gender bias is observed in fewer states in 2005 than was the case in the 1993. We find little 
evidence  of  gender-bias  in  enrollment  in  age  group  5-9,  while  pro-male  bias  in  conditional 
education expenditure is observed only in a few states. However, pro-male bias in enrollment is 
observed in age group 10-14 and 15-19. While in the age group 10-14 pro-male bias in education 
expenditure is observed in more states than pro-male bias in enrollment, in age group 15-19, pro-
male bias is observed in the decision to enroll in more states than the decision on amount of 
expenditure  conditional  on  enrollment.  Fourth,  the  results  reveal  a  great  deal  of  regional 




Thus the near achievement of universal enrollment at the elementary level in India has 
not  been  translated  into  higher  enrollment  at  the  secondary  and  senior  secondary  levels, 
especially in the rural areas. Not only there exists a large gender gap in enrollment in age group 
15-19 in rural areas of many states, the overall enrollment rate in these states remains extremely 
low, especially for girls. Given that significant pro-male bias is observed in enrollment decision 
in higher age groups, promoting girls‘ education remains a priority area. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical strategy, Section 3 
describes the data, Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Empirical Strategy 
We begin the analysis with the estimation of a standard Engel curve linking budget shares 
on educational expenditure with total household expenditure and the demographic composition 
of the household. We use the Working-Leser specification as follows: 
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where    is the budget share of education of the  
th household;    is the total expenditure of the 
household;    is the household size;    
  
  
  is the natural log of total per capita expenditure; 
   
  
 
is the fraction of the household members in the  
th age-gender class where             refers 
to the  
th age-gender class within household       is a vector of other household characteristics  
such as household head‘s education, gender, occupation and dummy variables to capture state etc 
(these variables are defined in the Appendix Table A1); and    is the error term.             and 




non-linearity in log per capita expenditure (lnpce). The term    allows for an independent scale 
effect  of household  size. Since the           fractions  add up to unity, one of them has  to be 
omitted from the regression. We allow for 14 age-gender group: males and females aged 0-4, 5-
9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-60 and 61 and above (omitting the fraction of women aged 61 and 
above  in  the  regression  analysis).
1  The      coefficients  capture  the  effect  of  household 
composition on household budgetary allocations. These coefficients tell us the effect of changing 
household composition holding household size constant, for example by replacing a child aged 
5-9 by a child aged 10-14 or by replacing a male with a female in a given age category. The 
difference across gender can be tested using an F-test under the following null hypothesis: 
           (2) 
where   denotes males and   denotes females and k refers to a given age-category.
2  
Conventionally, Equation 1 has been estimated using OLS including all households. This 
is because some or much of the bias against girls may occur in the decision of whether to enroll a 
child in school, i.e. in the zero-versus-positive spending decision,                 , rather than 
only  in  the  decision  of  how  much  to  spend  conditional  on  enrollment.  However,  a  simple 
application of the OLS model to data yields parameter estimates which are biased downwards 
because  of  censoring  of  dependent  variable  as  a  large  proportion  of  households  report  zero 
education expenditure  (Deaton,  1997).  In  addition  to  biased  estimates,  averaging across two 
decisions (enrollment decision and conditional education expenditure decision) leads to a failure 
to detect overall gender bias if they work in opposite directions. Hence, it is important to separate 
the two decisions.  
                                                        
1These age-gender categories are defined as M0to4, F0to4, M5to9, F5to9 etc. and are the proportion of Males (M) 
and Females (F) in age 0-4, 5-9 and so in a given household.  
2For example, testing whether boys aged 10-14 are treated differently from girls aged 10-14, we simply test whether 
the coefficient on M10to14 (proportion of males aged 10 to 14 years in the household) is significantly different from 




We use a Hurdle model (Wooldridge, 2002, p536-38) to separate the initial decision of w 
= 0 from the decision of how much w given positive w.
3 Hurdle Models are two-tier models 
because the hurdle or first tier is the decision of whether to choose a positive w or not (w = 0 
versus w > 0), and the second tier is the decision of how much to spend conditional on spending 
a positive amount          . A simple Hurdle model can be written as follows: 
                         (3) 
                                (4) 
where w is the share of family budget spent on education,   is a vector of explanatory variables, 
   and   are parameters to be estimated while   is the standard deviation of w. Equation 3 shows 
the probability that   is positive or zero, and Equation 4 stipulates that conditional on       
      follows a lognormal distribution.
4 One can obtain an estimate of   from a probit using w = 
0 versus w > 0 as the binary response. Because of the assumption that conditional on       
        follows a classical linear model, the OLS estimator     is consistent, and the consistent 
estimator  of   is  just  the  usual  standard  error  from  the  OLS  regression.  The  conditional 
expectation of              and the unconditional expectation        are easy to obtain using 
properties of log normal distribution: 
                                   (5) 
                                     (6) 
which can be easily estimated given             . One can obtain the marginal effect of    on   by 
transforming the marginal effect of log (w) and using the exponent. Taking the derivative of the 
                                                        
3 Tobit model is another available alternative, however, it is identified only if the assumptions of normality and 
homoskedasticity are fulfilled (Deaton, 1997). Moreover, it assumes that a single mechanism determines the choice 
between                    and  the  amount  of  w  given  w>0.  In  particular,                     and 
                      are constrained to have the same sign 





conditional expectation of w with respect to   , we can obtain the marginal effect of   on w in the 
OLS regression of log (w) conditional on w > 0. This is as follows: 
 
             
   
                          
(7) 
The combined marginal effect of    on w, i.e. taking account of the effect of    on the probability 
that  w  >  0  and  on  the  size  of         ,  can  be  obtained  by  taking  the  derivative  of  the 
unconditional expectation of w with respect to   . We can use the product rule and take the 
derivative of the unconditional expectation to obtain the combined marginal effect as follows: 
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  In the analysis that follows, we estimate three equations for each state: 1) Unconditional 
OLS equation of the budget share of education (conventional Engel curve) in the household level 
analysis,  and  OLS  equation  of  unconditional  education  expenditure  in  the  individual  level 
analysis; 2) Probit equation of the binary decision whether the budget  share of education is 
positive  at  the  household  level  analysis,  and  the  probit  equation  of  whether  any  positive 
educational expenditure is incurred on the child in the individual level analysis; 3) Conditional 
OLS of log of budget share of education in the household level analysis, i.e. conditional on 
positive budget share of education, and OLS of log of conditional education expenditure in the 
individual level analysis. 
Household level equations are fitted for households with at least one child aged 5-19 years. 
At the individual level we estimate the same equations but, instead of the dependent variable in 
the OLS equations being the budget share of education (as in household level analysis), the 




variables are  the same in household  and individual-level  equations  except  for  gender: while 
household level equations include proportion of household members in 14 age-gender categories, 
individual level equations use age of child and a dummy variable for male. 
3.  Data 
We use data from the 2005 India Human Development Survey (IHDS-II), a nationally 
representative  household  data  set  collected  by  the  National  Council  of  Applied  Economic 
Research  in  New  Delhi  and  the  University  of  Maryland  (Desai,  Reeve  and  NCAER  2009). 
IHDS-II  covers  41,554  households  located  throughout  India.
5 ‘
6  The  data  have  detailed 
information  on  education  expenditure  for  persons  who  are  enrolled  and  comprehensive 
information  on  total  household  expenditure.
7 The  household  level  analysis is limited to   the 
households that have at least one member in age group 5-19, which reduced the sample size to 
30,351 households:  19,931 residing in rural area and 10,420  residing  in urban areas.  The 
individual level analysis is based at the level of individual child, i.e., on 71,567 children in age 
group 5-19, out of which 48,882 reside in rural areas and 22 ,685 reside in urban areas. In our 
sample, the share of education expenditure in total household expenditure is 3.5 percent in rural 
areas, 6.4 percent in urban areas, and 4.3 percent in all India sample.
8  
                                                        
5 The survey covered all the states and union territories of India except Andaman and Nicobar; and Lakshadweep, 
two  union  territories  which  together  account  for  less  than  .05  percent  of  India's  population.  The  data  recently 
became available publicly from the Data Sharing for Demographic Research program of ICPSR, the Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research.  
6 Kingdon (2005) used IHDS-I, which was conducted by the National Council of Applied Economic Research in 
1993-94 in rural areas of 16 major states in India. In 2001, the states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttarakhand 
were carved out of the parental states of Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh. In addition we also have Jammu 
& Kashmir, North East (Combination of smaller states in North East of India), and Delhi (primarily urban).  
7 Total education expenditure on a school going child is derived by adding expenditure on school fees, books, 
uniforms, and private tuition. 
8 Note that our sample consists of households that have at least one child in age group 5-19. For all households, the 
share of education expenditure in household expenditure is 2.7 percent in rural areas, 4.9 percent in urban areas, and 




Table 1 presents the state wise current enrollment rate for boys and girls. Among the rural 
age group 5-9, girls have statistically significantly lower enrollment than boys in only two states 
(Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh) which is a substantial improvement from the 1993 situation 
when this was the case in nine of the 16 major states examined (Kingdon, 2005). In urban areas, 
only Jharkhand has lower enrollment for girls in age group 5-9, while in most of the other states 
girls have comparable or better enrollment than boys. Between 1993 and 2005, there is also a 
significant improvement in enrollment for girls in the rural age group 10-14: girls have lower 
enrollment than boys in only seven states in 2005 compared to the 1993 situation where girls‘ 
lower enrollment was observed in all the states except Kerala and West Bengal. A significant 
improvement over time in gender parity in enrollment is also observed in age group 15-19. While 
rural girls had lower enrollment than boys in almost all major states (except Kerala) in 1993, by 
2005 they had lower enrollment only in half of the states. In urban areas, only four states have 
lower enrollment for girls in age groups 10-14 and 15-19; however it is surprising that lower 
enrollment  of  girls  than  boys  is  observed  in  Gujarat  (in  both  these  age  groups)  and  in 
Maharashtra (in the 10-14 age group) which are economically well-to-do states in India.          
Table 2 presents mean educational expenditure on all children in the three concerned age 
groups  (it  includes  zero  education  expenditure  by  the  non-enrolled),  while  Table  3  presents 
conditional education expenditure, i.e. education expenditure for enrolled children only. Table 2 
shows that education expenditure on girls is lower compared to boys in a larger number of states 
in rural areas than in urban areas in all the three age groups. It is interesting that the pro-male 
bias in education expenditure is observed in far fewer states when we take education expenditure 
conditional on enrollment. This suggests that some of the gender bias in education occurs at the 




through  girls‘  lower  probability  of  enrollment  (since  non-enrollment  implies  zero  education 
expenditure), especially in the higher age groups.  
4.  Results 
The results are divided into two parts. In the first part, we present the results obtained by 
using household-level aggregated data. We explore, using conventional Engel curve approach, 
whether there is evidence that the allocation of household education expenditure favors male 
over  female  children.  We  also  explore  whether  averaging  across  two  decisions  (positive 
education  expenditure  decision  and  actual  education  expenditure  amount  decision)  makes  a 
difference to detecting gender bias. As explained in the methodology section, this is done by 
comparing results  from  conventional  Engel curve approach with  the results  from the hurdle 
model. In the second part, we explore whether aggregation of data at the household level hinders 
detection of gender bias; we do this by comparing results from household-level data with those 
obtained  using  individual  child  level  data.  With  child  level  data  we  also  ask  again  whether 
separating the two decisions (positive education expenditure decision and the actual amount of 
expenditure decision) enhances our understanding of the nature of gender bias in education. To 
achieve this, we estimate the unconditional OLS of education expenditure and also the hurdle 
model using individual child level data. We further check the robustness of the results obtained 
from  individual-level  analysis  by  introducing  household  fixed  effects.  Finally,  we  explore 
whether any observed bias in education expenditure comes through differential choice of school-




4.1.  Analysis with household level data  
Using  household-level  data,  we  estimate  three  equations  for  rural  and  urban  areas 
separately (and pooled together) for each state, and for all India: (a) a binary probit of whether 
the household‘s education budget share is positive or zero; (b) the OLS of the natural log of 
education budget share, conditional on positive education budget share; and (c) the conventional 
Engel  curve  equation.  We  also  put  the  results  of  (a)  and  (b)  together  to  come  up  with  the 
combined marginal effect of the gender variable, in the way described above in Equation 8. For 
space reasons, we do not report the full estimation results (that would entail reporting nearly 200 
equations - 3 equations each for rural, urban and pooled (rural plus urban) for each of 22 states), 
but the results are available from the authors. For brevity, we only report in Table 4a the main 
result, i.e. the difference in marginal effect (DME) of the demographic variables (proportion of 
males and females in given age groups within the household), for each of the three age groups: 5-
9, 10-14, and 15-19. The DME for a given age group within each state is calculated from the 
results of the full model for the state. For example, to calculate DME for all-India, we estimate 
the three equations using the all-India sample. In the probit equation of ‗positive educational 
expenditure‘  (which  is  a  proxy  for  enrolling  children  in  school,  since  school  enrolment  is 
associated with at least some expenditure), at the all-India level (see Appendix Table A1), the 
marginal effect of the variable ‗proportion of household males aged 5 to 9‘ or M5to9 is 0.639 
and the marginal effect of the variable ‗proportion of household females aged 5-9‘ or F5to9 is 
0.577. Thus the gender difference in the age group 5-9 is 0.062. Table 4a (first cell) shows this 
difference multiplied by 100, which is 6.18. The F-test (Equation 2) tells us that this difference 
in marginal effect (DME) is statistically insignificant at 5% significance level. That is, in the 5-9 




propensity to incur positive educational expenditure for girls and boys. Indeed, this remains the 
case for all states except Rajasthan where there is a significant difference (at the 10% level) in 
households‘ propensity to incur positive educational expenditure on girls and boys: in Rajasthan, 
when an extra boy is added to the household in the 5-9 age range, the household‘s probability of 
incurring positive education expenditure (enrolling children in school) is 24 percentage points 
higher than when an extra girl is added to the household in that age range.  
In the 10-14 age group (the middle school age group), there is clear pro-male bias in this 
propensity to enroll children in school at the All-India level and in five states – Bihar, Jharkhand, 
Madhya Pradesh,  Rajasthan and Jammu & Kashmir.  In the 15-19 age  group  (the secondary 
school age group), there is again clear pro-male bias in school enrolment probability in All-India 
and in eight of the states, including the apparently more ‗progressive‘ states such as Karnataka, 
West Bengal and Maharashtra. Comparing the probit equations across the age-groups then, we 
see  a  pattern  whereby  gender  bias  in  school  enrollment  (proxied  by  positive  education 
expenditure) increases with age, the pro-male bias being smallest at the primary school age, 
larger at the middle school age and largest at the secondary school age.   
Looking at education expenditure conditional on household incurring positive education 
expenditure (columns 2 in Table 4a), we again see a pattern where gender bias increases by age 
group. Statistically significant pro-male bias in actual education expenditure is found in only two 
states in the 5-9 age group (Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh), in four states in the 10-14 age 
group, and in eight states in the 15-19 age group.  
Column  (3)  of  Table  4a  reports  the  results  of  the  hurdle  model,  i.e.  it  reports  the 
combined marginal effect of the demographic variables (M5to9, F5to9, etc.), putting together the 




again, unsurprisingly, we see a pattern of increasing bias by age group.  Moreover, we see that – 
taking India as a whole – the combined marginal effect of the gender variable is progressively 
larger as age group increases: it goes from 1.07 in the 5-9 group, to 1.24 in the 10-14 group and 
increases to 2.92 in the 15-19 age group. 
Finally, Column 4 of Table 4a reports the findings of conventional Engel Curve analysis 
and this allows us to compare the results with the hurdle model of Column 3. According to 
Column  4,  in  the  5-9  age  group,  there  is  statistically  significant  pro-male  gender  bias  in 
education expenditure (at the 5% level) in only two states whereas the hurdle model (Column 3) 
shows  such  bias  in  three  states  (and  at  ‗All-India‘).  Again,  in  the  10-14  age  group,  the 
conventional analysis of shows significant bias in four states  (including ‗All-India‘) whereas 
hurdle model shows bias in five states. Finally in the 15-19 age group, conventional analysis 
shows bias at the 5% level in six states (including ‗All-India‘) whereas hurdle model shows it in 
9 states. Thus, it is noticeable from Table 4a that the hurdle model is better able to detect gender 
bias than the conventional Engel curve model, as also found in Kingdon (2005). This is because 
the hurdle model is a more flexible formulation; it allows for the possibility that gender bias in 
the  enrolment  (positive  expenditure)  decision  can  differ  from  any  gender  bias  in  the  actual 
education expenditure amount decision.  
Unpacking the decisions using hurdle model, we find that in some cases the bias works in 
opposite directions. For example, in case of Gujarat, a pro-male bias is observed (although not 
significant)  in  the  enrollment  decision  (probit,  Column  1),  however,  a  pro-female  bias  is 
observed in conditional education expenditure (conditional OLS, Column 2).  Unpacking the 
decisions  using  the  hurdle  model  helps  us  to  unravel  gender  bias  in  more  states  than  the 




bias in Engel method. Hence, the incorrect functional form of Engel Method can be partially 
blamed for its failure to detect gender bias in some cases; however, the aggregation of data at the 
household level can also make the detection of gender-bias difficult. In the next section, we 
explore whether using individual-level data makes any difference as far as detection of gender 
bias is concerned.  
Dividing  the  analysis  by  rural  (Table  4b)  and  urban  (Table  4c)  indicates  that  the 
substantial gender biases we observe in Table 4a are driven largely by rural areas. There is little 
gender bias in urban parts of India, barring a few instances. Moreover, while pro-male bias is 
observed in the enrollment decision in rural areas of quite a few states, the 2005 situation is a 
significant improvement over the 1993 situation when pro-male bias is observed in rural areas of 
11 out of 16 states (Kingdon, 2005). 
4.2.  Analysis with individual-level data 
  Does individual-level expenditure provide a more reliable way of detecting gender bias 
than using household level data? Since we have educational expenditure information at the level 
of the individual child (as well as, by aggregation, at the level of the household), it is possible to 
compare household-level Engel curve results of Section 4.1 with individual-level analysis. In this 
child  level  analysis,  the  dependent  variable  is  education  expenditure  on  the  individual  child 
(rather than household budget share of education used in Section 4.1). Moreover, instead of 
demographic  variables  such  as  household‘s  proportion  of  males  aged  5–9  and  household‘s 





9 The remaining explanatory variables in the individual level equations 
are identical to those in the household level equations of Table 4. At the individual child level, 
we estimated 621 separate equations: (22 states + all India= 23) × (rural, urban, all= 3) × (3 age 
groups) × (3 equations). For brevity, we only report  the marginal effect on the gender variable 
MALE from these equations in Tables 5a – 5c as our main interest lies in detecting gender bias.   
  The marginal effects on MALE in Tables 5a-5c are not comparable with the difference in 
marginal effects (DME) of the household demographic variables reported in Tables 4a-4c. This 
is because the household demographic variables in a household-level regression are not identical 
to  the  dummy  variable  MALE  in  the  individual-level  regression.  In  addition,  the  dependent 
variable in the conditional and unconditional OLS equations in Table 5 is education expenditure 
on  the  individual  child  but  in  Table  4  the  corresponding  dependent  variable  is  household 
education budget share.  
Two things stand out through simple observation of Table 5a (rural plus urban pooled). 
First, even the unconditional OLS picks up gender bias in many more states than what it picked 
up at the household level (Table 4a). For example, in the age group 10-14, Table 4a (household 
level results) shows significant pro-male bias in only four states while Table 5a (individual-level 
results) shows such bias in thirteen states (including ‗All-India‘). This suggests that there is 
something  in  the  aggregation  that  makes  it  more  difficult  to  pick  up  gender  differences  in 
education expenditure. Second, as before with household level data, so also with individual-level 
data,  comparison  of  hurdle  model  results  (combined  probit  and  conditional  OLS)  with 
                                                        
9 Since MALE is a discrete variable, the marginal effect of MALE in the combined hurdle model (probit + 
OLS) is estimated by calculating the expected values of unconditional expenditure in Equation 6 with MALE=1 and 





unconditional OLS results shows that the hurdle model is more effective at picking up gender 
bias than the conventional unconditional OLS model. For example, in the 5-9 age group in Table 
5a, the unconditional OLS results of Column 4 show significant pro-male bias in only 6 states (at 
the 5% significance level), while the Hurdle model results of Column 3 show such bias in 8 
states.  
As  with  household  level  data,  the  incidence  of  pro-male  bias  in  enrollment  decision 
increases in higher age groups and is highest in the age group 15-19 (Table 5a). It is noteworthy 
that while pro-male bias is observed in conditional education expenditure in many states in age 
group 10-14, the incidence of such bias in conditional education expenditure is less in age group 
15-19. In the age groups 5-9 and 10-14, much of the gender-differentiated treatment occurs at the 
second stage i.e., in the decision of how much to spend (given that children of both genders are 
enrolled in school); however, pro-male bias in the enrollment decision also remains important in 
age group 10-14 years. In contrast, much of the gender-differentiated treatment in age group 15-
19  occurs  at  the  stage  of the decision whether to  even incur positive education expenditure 
(enroll a child in school)---pro-male bias is observed at the second stage in only 6 states in 
comparison to the 13 states where pro-male bias is observed at the first stage. These patterns 
hold both in urban and rural areas, and are starker in the urban areas (Table 5c).  
In some instances, the marginal effect of MALE in the conditional expenditure equation 
is negative, that is, girls have somewhat higher education expenditure, conditional on being in 
school, though this pro-female bias is statistically significant only in Tamil Nadu (Table 5a). 
What is of more concern is that a pro-male bias in enrollment is observed in age group 15-19 in 
well to do states like Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Karnataka. This raises the question why parents 




gender bias could originate on the supply of the market for education. There may be lack of 
single sex secondary or higher secondary schools for girls in rural areas. People in rural areas 
might be more reluctant to send an adolescent girl to a coeducational school or to a school which 
involve significant commuting time. There are also reasons for different demand for education. 
Providing education at the secondary and senior secondary levels (age group 15-19) involves a 
significant expenditure in rural areas (Table 3). In this case a economically weak household may 
prefer  to  educate  sons  who  are  more  likely  to  support  them  in  old  age.  In  addition,  child 
marriages still continue despite the fact that the Child Marriage Restraint Act was enacted as far 
way back as in 1929. Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have 
high incidence of child marriages, and   girl child are more prone to an early marriage.    
4.2.1   Household Fixed Effects: Gender differences within or across households? 
Using individual-level data, we found that pro-male bias exist in many states (Section 
4.2). However, Jensen (2002) suggests that gender inequality in outcomes could arise even in the 
absence of any parental bias against daughters. If parents have a strong preference for male 
children, they will continue child bearing until one (or their desired number of) male offspring is 
born. This type of fertility behavior implies that, on average, female children will have a larger 
number  of  siblings  and  larger  household  size  than  male  children.  So  any  observed  lower 
educational expenditures on girls than boys could be an across-household phenomenon due to 
differential  household  sizes  for  girls  and  boys  in  the  population.  If  household  size  is 
endogenously chosen in the way Jensen (2002) describes then simply controlling for household 
size will not be suffice. To check the robustness of our findings, we introduce household fixed 




controlling  for  unobserved  parental  fertility  preferences  and  thus  for  the  endogeneity  of 
household size.  
We  estimate  three  equations  using  individual-level  data  for  each  state:  1)  a  Linear 
Probability  Model  (LPM)  equation  of  ANYEDEXP  (whether  any  positive  expenditure  was 
incurred  on  the  child‘s  education);  2)  an  OLS  equation  of  the  educational  expenditure 
(EDUEXP)  conditional  on  positive  educational  expenditure;  and  3)  a  OLS  unconditional 
educational expenditure (EDUEXP) equation. These equations are fitted on the sample of only 
those households that have at least one child of each gender in the relevant age range.
10 Table 6 
reports coefficient of the MALE dummy in the three equations from the household fixed effects 
estimation. We find pro-male bias in many states in both  decisions---the decision to enroll as 
well as the conditional and unconditional expenditure decisions---in all the three age groups, 
though there are some variations.  
Family fixed effects (FE) results (Table 6) are similar but not identical to the OLS results 
(Table 5a).  For example, the coefficient on MALE gender dummy variable in the unconditional 
education expenditure equation for age 5-9 group is positive and statistically significant at the 
5% level in Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh in Table 5a but insignificant in Table 6. Similarly 
in  the other two age groups  there are some differences  in  results  between the OLS and FE 
approaches of Tables 5a and 6. However, for most states, findings in the OLS individual-level 
analysis of Table 5a are similar to those in the family FE analysis and thus we take it that most 
gender differences cannot be simply attributed to differences in the household size across the 
population.  
                                                        
10 The estimation is done using combined sample (urban and rural) in each state because of sample size 




4.2.2  Does the bias in educational expenditure through school choice? 
In  individual-level  analysis,  we  found  that  statistically  significant  pro-male  bias  in 
education expenditure exists in many states. Is less spent on enrolled girls than boys through 
differential school-type choice for the two sexes; for example, through a greater likelihood of 
sending boys to private schools than girls? There are three types of schools in India: government 
schools, private schools and government-aided schools. In government-aided schools, teachers 
receive  their  salary  directly  from  the  state  and  are  recruited  by  a  government  appointed 
commission  but  their routine operations  are  governed by the private management (Kingdon, 
2008).  Since  in  cost  and  teacher  qualification  they  are  similar  to  government  schools,  we 
combined these with government schools.
11 The education expenditure is considerably higher for 
children attending private schools (Appendix Table A2) in all the states. Raw gender differences 
in private school attendance show that boys are significantly more likely to attend private schools 
in 5 states in age group 5-9, in 7 states in age group 10-14, and three states in age group 15-19. 
Only in Orissa, girls in age group 15-19 are more likely to attend private school. At the all India 
level, while boys are more likely to attend private school in age group 5-9 and 10-14, there is no 
difference in private school attendance in age group 15 -19. At the senior secondary level,  the 
availability of private schools is limited in comparison to availability of private schools at lower 
levels. This probably is reflected in no difference in private school attendance by gender in age 
group 15-19.  
However, school choice is determined by a number of observed and unobserved  factors. 
To control for observed factors, we estimate a linear probability model (LPM) of school choice 
                                                        




on  all  currently  enrolled  children,  conditioning  on  observed  household  characteristics.
12 The 
gender dummy variable (Male) captures the impact of gender on the choice of private schooling. 
We only report the coefficient of gender dummy in Table 7.  The estimates from LPM model 
show that even after controlling for household level obs erved factors, boys are more likely to 
attend private schools. The pro-male bias in attendance of private school in age group 15 -19 is 
observed in more states after controlling for observed factor s. For all India, no difference in 
private school attendance is observed in age group 15-19; however, after controlling for observed 
factors, the boys are 2 percent more likely to attend private school.  
To control for both observed and unobserved factors   at the household-level, we re-
estimate the LPM models with household fixed effects.  By controlling for observables and un-
observables within the family, fixed-effects estimation allows us to test whether the observed 
pro-male bias is an across household or within household phenomenon.  For this, the sample of 
households is restricted to only those households who had at least one child of each gender in the 
relevant age group and currently enrolled in school. In age groups 5-9 and 10-14 boys are five 
percentage points more likely to be enrolled in private schools than girls.  When we allow for 
household fixed effects, pro-male bias is observed in more states in  these age groups. Fixed-
effects estimation  strengthens the findings that boys are more likely to attend private schools 
than the girls. Thus one mechanism through which household s achieve lower expenditures on 
education for girls is through a lower probability of sending them to private schools.  
                                                        
12 Independent variables include log of per capita expenditure (lpce), square of lpce, log of household size, education 
and occupational status of household‘s head,  area of residence,  a gender (MALE) dummy, dummies for states (in 




5.  Conclusion 
The paper revisits  the issue of  gender-bias in  educational  expenditure  in  India.  Most of the 
existing literature on the gender bias in education expenditure in India uses data from the early 
1990s, and concentrates on only a few states. Kingdon (2005) was the first study to use all India 
rural data from 1993 to study the gender-bias in education expenditure. However, since then the 
liberalization of the Indian economy led to rapid economic growth, reduced poverty and greatly 
increased school  enrolment  rates.  This  paper revisits  the issue of  gender-bias in  educational 
expenditure using a recently available India Human Development Survey (IHDS-II), which was 
collected during 2004-05 and is representative at the state and national level.  In addition to 
providing evidence on gender bias in both urban and rural areas of each state, the paper also 
establishes  the  progress  made  in  gender-parity  in  rural  India  between  1993  and  2005  by 
comparing the results of this paper with Kingdon (2005), which concentrated only on rural areas 
because of non-availability of data from urban areas.  
We find that Unconditional OLS---which is what the past literature uses---is weak in 
detecting gender bias. Unpacking the decisions into two parts (through hurdle model) does a 
much better job. In addition, availability of individual level data greatly improves the ability to 
detect gender bias---disaggregation of data at the household level appears to mute gender effects 
and make it harder to detect gender bias. While we find evidence of gender bias in a few states 
using the household-level data and traditional Engel method, using the same methodology with 
individual-level  data  helped  us  to  unravel  gender-bias  in  many  more  states.  We  find  little 




or  in  individual-level  data),  while  pro-male  bias  in  education  expenditure  conditional  on 
enrollment is observed in several states.  
The incidence of pro-male bias in enrollment is substantially higher in older age groups.  
While in the 10-14 age group, pro-male bias in education expenditure is observed in more states 
than the pro-male bias in enrollment, in age group 15-19, pro-male bias is observed in more 
states  in  the  enrolment  decision  than  in  the  amount  of  expenditure  incurred  conditional  on 
enrollment. Overall, the results reveal regional disparities in nature and existence of gender-bias, 
and between the age groups.  
 Evidence  of  greater  gender-bias  in  higher  age  groups  raises  some  important  policy 
issues. Given  the  large  economic  returns  to  higher  education  in  India  (Kingdon,  2009; 
Colclough,  Kingdon  and  Patrinos,  2010),  and  given  the  benefits  of  higher  education  for 
economic  growth  and  development,  increasing  access  to  higher  education  is  increasingly  an 
important  objective  of  policy-makers  everywhere.  Given  that  significant  pro-male  bias  is 
observed in the enrollment decision in higher age groups in many economically backward states, 
promoting  girls‘  education  remain  an  area  of  priority.  What  is  more  of  the  concern  is  the 
existence of pro-male bias in enrollment in age group 15-19 in economically well to do states 
such as Gujarat and Maharashtra.  It remains an important question why parents are reluctant to 
send girl children to school in higher age groups, specifically in age group 15-19. Whether it is a 
supply side constraint (non availability of single sex school in rural areas that may be preferred 
for adolescent girls) or demand side constraints related to lingering cultural and gender norms 
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    Table 1: Current enrolment rate of children by age group, location and gender   
 
Rural  Urban 
 
Age 5-9  Age 10-14  Age 15-19  Age 5-9  Age 10-14  Age 15-19 
State  Male  Female  Gap  Male  Female  Gap  Male  Female  Gap  Male  Female  Gap  Male  Female  Gap  Male  Female  Gap 
All India  76.7  73.8  2.8**  86.7  80.4  6.3**  48.6  34.3  14.2**  85.4  85.7  -0.2  89.8  87.4  2.5**  59.6  56.3  3.3** 
Andhra Pradesh  90.3  90.1  0.2  88.2  81.9  6.3**  53.4  30.8  22.6**  94.6  94.2  0.4  90.8  89.1  1.6  60.3  52.3  8.0 
Assam  70.3  74.7  -4.4  72.0  78.7  -6.7  35.7  42.6  -6.9  86.8  85.2  1.5  88.2  86.1  2.2  72.6  70.7  1.9 
Bihar  59.3  55.0  4.3  80.8  62.5  18.3**  40.0  26.7  13.3**  78.9  80.8  -1.9  85.7  80.6  5.1  57.3  54.7  2.6 
Chhattisgarh  66.4  62.6  3.8  88.6  83.2  5.4  46.1  22.7  23.5**  85.3  90.0  -4.7  90.3  83.3  7.0  70.8  62.5  8.3 
Delhi  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  82.3  82.1  0.2  92.3  92.1  0.1  62.9  59.9  3.0 
Gujarat  84.8  77.3  7.4*  89.7  81.8  7.9**  38.8  17.6  21.2**  83.3  83.3  0.0  89.9  82.9  7.0**  55.1  43.4  11.7** 
Haryana  82.3  78.6  3.7  89.9  87.3  2.6  58.1  43.4  14.7**  88.4  90.7  -2.4  85.7  89.3  -3.6  83.6  66.7  16.9** 
Himachal Pradesh  88.5  85.6  3.0  96.8  96.0  0.7  77.1  74.8  2.3  94.7  98.1  -3.4  95.5  97.2  -1.7  84.1  83.3  0.7 
Jammu & Kashmir  93.4  91.1  2.3  92.1  88.4  3.7  62.5  55.7  6.8  94.6  92.9  1.7  96.5  93.6  2.9  85.6  72.7  12.8** 
Jharkhand  61.2  66.7  -5.5  78.9  64.6  14.3**  32.1  35.3  -3.2  91.0  77.9  13.1**  91.0  89.2  1.9  76.3  64.2  12.1** 
Karnataka  75.4  72.8  2.6  87.3  87.2  0.1  49.7  37.5  12.1**  88.2  87.8  0.4  92.1  92.7  -0.6  59.2  57.0  2.2 
Kerala  81.1  94.1  -13.0**  99.6  100.0  -0.4  75.2  73.9  1.3  79.8  79.4  0.4  99.2  99.2  0.0  77.1  69.1  8.0 
Madhya Pradesh  71.4  65.5  6.0**  87.4  79.7  7.7**  51.7  28.8  22.8**  82.8  82.9  -0.1  91.4  83.6  7.8**  54.3  51.6  2.8 
Maharashtra  77.5  78.4  -0.9  92.7  87.6  5.1*  54.1  41.7  12.4**  83.4  83.3  0.1  97.1  93.7  3.3**  60.4  60.8  -0.4 
Northeast  82.2  85.7  -3.6  93.1  86.4  6.6*  58.0  52.4  5.6  90.5  99.1  -8.6**  94.8  98.0  -3.2  82.3  84.6  -2.3 
Orissa  85.7  84.9  0.8  81.8  77.2  4.6  28.7  18.1  10.6**  89.6  85.9  3.7  86.5  87.7  -1.2  47.8  45.9  1.9 
Punjab  85.6  87.5  -1.8  91.1  87.1  3.9  52.2  48.5  3.7  93.1  95.7  -2.6  92.6  92.9  -0.3  62.8  71.6  -8.8* 
Rajasthan  79.2  65.1  14.0**  86.9  67.8  19.1**  47.4  23.7  23.7**  82.7  80.3  2.4  85.7  79.3  6.3**  55.0  46.6  8.3* 
Tamil Nadu  86.0  83.9  2.1  96.1  92.2  3.8  62.8  44.4  18.3  89.8  95.7  -5.9**  94.6  93.9  0.7  61.2  54.0  7.1 
Uttar Pradesh  77.9  74.9  3.1  86.7  82.7  4.0**  49.9  31.6  18.3**  81.2  80.4  0.9  78.4  76.4  2.0  46.9  50.0  -3.1 
Uttarakhand  79.3  81.1  -1.7  94.2  90.5  3.7  72.7  58.5  14.2*  64.4  89.3  -24.9**  88.3  87.2  1.1  65.9  66.1  -0.2 
West Bengal  81.1  77.2  4.0  78.2  79.2  -0.9  37.4  30.6  6.8*  90.5  85.5  5.0  86.1  81.7  4.4  57.9  55.9  2.0 
Note:  [1]. Gender gap is the difference between male and female enrolment in each age group. Positive gap implies pro-male bias, while negative gap implies pro-female bias.              
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Table 2: Education Expenditure on all children (Enrolled and Non-enrolled) by age group, location and gender 
   Rural  Urban 
 
Age 5-9  Age 10-14  Age 15-19  Age 5-9  Age 10-14  Age 15-19 
State  Male  Female  Gap  Male  Female  Gap  Male  Female  Gap  Male  Female  Gap  Male  Female  Gap  Male  Female  Gap 
All India  565  455  110**  904  724  180**  1113  753  361**  2065  1772  293**  2523  2170  353**  2945  2364  581** 
Andhra Pradesh  971  641  330**  829  827  2  1435  1085  350  2185  1837  348  2830  2529  300  3738  2455  1283** 
Assam  137  126  12  365  290  75  284  466  -183**  732  707  25  1501  951  550**  1890  2156  -266 
Bihar  404  341  62  734  474  260**  875  298  577**  1629  1460  170  2306  1659  647**  1547  1663  -117 
Chhattisgarh  186  137  48**  324  275  49*  345  229  116  1854  1000  854**  1855  1263  592  4897  1736  3161** 
Delhi  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  1818  1333  486*  2333  2123  209  2251  2044  207 
Gujarat  449  415  34  1006  700  306**  788  332  455**  2746  2111  635  2620  2509  112  3359  2362  996* 
Haryana  1349  1108  241  1663  1651  12  2022  1182  840**  4835  4544  291  6047  4724  1323  7288  5539  1749 
Himachal Pradesh  1770  1431  340*  2628  1963  665**  3604  2443  1161**  5368  4819  549  6084  5780  304  4961  3922  1039 
Jammu & Kashmir  1147  1287  -140  2102  1926  176  2731  2293  438  3310  3078  232  5425  4091  1335  4882  3775  1106 
Jharkhand  331  448  -117  719  551  168  416  925  -509  3164  2024  1139**  3559  3185  374  3958  2487  1471** 
Karnataka  499  469  29  704  675  29  1120  739  381**  2903  2318  584*  2811  2260  551*  3147  2835  312 
Kerala  1591  1355  236  2230  2083  146  3223  3623  -399  1356  1583  -227  2441  1986  455  2945  2210  735 
Madhya Pradesh  294  267  27  531  369  162**  623  228  396**  1100  1135  -35  1651  1379  272  1306  1247  59 
Maharashtra   193  207  -14  433  382  51*  700  401  299**  1321  1157  164  1712  1632  80  2046  1577  469* 
Northeast  1445  1627  -182  1742  1556  186  1829  1444  386  3687  3980  -293  4158  4783  -625  5436  5176  260 
Orissa  350  289  61  521  515  5  344  269  75  1807  1300  507*  2267  2159  108  1398  1994  -596 
Punjab  1963  1614  348  2457  2007  450**  2319  2127  192  4649  4978  -329  5518  4445  1073**  4568  4839  -271 
Rajasthan  622  431  191**  1065  615  450**  1137  442  695**  1735  1475  261  2441  1774  667**  2479  2189  290 
Tamil Nadu  1076  468  608  738  748  -11  1839  1117  722  2052  1839  213  1720  1805  -85  3013  2307  706 
Uttar Pradesh  405  289  116**  854  572  282**  1041  433  609**  1781  1491  290  2113  1984  128  2558  2061  497 
Uttarakhand  820  937  -117  1354  992  362**  1309  1078  230  1952  3276  -1324*  4675  3986  689  5936  6318  -382 
West Bengal  522  533  -11  1044  902  143  991  880  111  2412  2007  406  3410  2732  678  3828  3159  668 
Note: [1]. Gender gap is the difference between average expenditure on male and female child in each age group. Positive gap implies pro-male bias, while negative gap implies 
pro-female bias. [2]. ** statistically significant at 5% level; *statistically significant at 10% level;  N/A: not applicable.             






Table 3: Education Expenditure on enrolled children by age group, location and gender 
   Rural  Urban 
 
Age 5-9  Age 10-14  Age 15-19  Age 5-9  Age 10-14  Age 15-19 
State  Male  Female  Gap  Male  Female  Gap  Male  Female  Gap  Male  Female  Gap  Male  Female  Gap  Male  Female  Gap 
All India  740  621  119**  1045  902  143**  2302  2203  99  2424  2078  345**  2814  2491  323**  4961  4217  744** 
Andhra Pradesh  1076  712  364**  943  1010  -67  2696  3519  -822  2310  1950  360  3118  2838  280  6229  4690  1539* 
Assam  197  168  29  507  368  139  795  1094  -299*  844  856  -12  1702  1119  583*  2604  3049  -445 
Bihar  685  625  60  910  759  151  2215  1133  1082**  2065  1807  257  2690  2069  621**  2746  3094  -348 
Chhattisgarh  280  222  58*  367  331  36  748  1019  -272  2173  1111  1063**  2054  1515  538  6913  2778  4136* 
Delhi  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  2236  1636  600*  2528  2304  224  3578  3424  153 
Gujarat  532  536  -4  1122  859  263*  2029  1890  139  3309  2547  762  2929  3026  -98  6094  5448  646 
Haryana  1651  1419  232  1852  1893  -41  3493  2744  748  5471  5007  464  7055  5291  1764  8722  8435  287 
Himachal Pradesh  2007  1677  329  2726  2044  682**  4690  3286  1404**  5670  5005  666  6374  5948  426  5988  4767  1221 
Jammu & Kashmir  1239  1430  -191  2301  2196  105  4406  4144  262  3499  3362  137  5621  4371  1251  5704  5191  513 
Jharkhand  541  675  -134  911  863  48  1297  2640  -1343  3515  2599  917  3909  3571  338  5186  3874  1311* 
Karnataka  663  648  15  810  775  35  2266  1977  290  3304  2660  644**  3051  2437  614**  5317  4991  326 
Kerala  1962  1440  521*  2238  2083  154  4289  4932  -643  1712  2011  -299  2461  2003  458  3819  3269  550 
Madhya Pradesh  414  410  4  610  462  147**  1209  798  411**  1328  1369  -41  1806  1658  149  2432  2418  14 
Maharashtra   249  265  -15  468  436  32  1296  963  333**  1583  1401  183  1765  1747  18  3387  2595  792** 
Northeast  1759  1917  -158  1886  1801  85  3151  2752  399  4279  4016  263  4385  4882  -497  6606  6120  486 
Orissa  409  341  69  637  671  -34  1195  1485  -289  2016  1513  503  2621  2463  157  2945  4346  -1400 
Punjab  2296  1872  424*  2704  2303  400*  4454  4386  68  5028  5203  -175  5988  4784  1204**  7377  6754  622 
Rajasthan  799  662  136*  1231  907  324**  2412  1915  497*  2099  1842  257  2867  2253  614**  4511  4716  -204 
Tamil Nadu  1250  589  661  770  811  -42  3003  2516  488  2285  1932  353  1817  1930  -113  4924  4286  638 
Uttar Pradesh  522  390  132**  986  694  292**  2095  1376  719**  2198  1864  333  2716  2610  106  5489  4153  1336** 
Uttarakhand  1033  1156  -123  1438  1096  342*  1801  1843  -42  3031  3667  -636  5295  4571  724  9003  9555  -553 
West Bengal  647  699  -52  1343  1139  203  2649  2873  -224  2665  2362  303  3961  3363  598  6664  5705  959 
Note:  [1]. Gender gap is the difference between average expenditure on enrolled male and female child in each age group. Positive gap implies pro-male bias, while negative 
gap implies pro-female bias. [2]. ** statistically significant at 5% level; *statistically significant at 10% level;  N/A: not applicable.           





Table 4a: Difference in Marginal Effect (DME) × 100 of Gender Variables by age group (Household Results), All (Urban + Rural) 
   Age 5-9  Age 10-14  Age 15-19 
state 
area  Probit     
(1) 
Conditiona






l OLS    (4) 
Probit     
(1) 
Conditiona






l OLS    (4) 
Probit     
(1) 
Conditiona






l OLS    (4) 
All India  ALL  6.18  0.93*  1.07**  0.78*  13.94**  0.7  1.24**  1.72**  17.49**  2.50**  2.92**  3.02** 
Andhra Pradesh  ALL  6.88  1.53  1.63  2.86**  5.36  -0.79  -0.44  1.16  12  5.19**  5.04**  4.63* 
Assam  ALL  6.1  -0.55  -0.26  -1.53  -49.95*  1.08  -0.38  0.64  24.76  -0.17  0.45  -0.59 
Bihar  ALL  -1.46  -1.31  -1.08  -0.62  48.51**  4.33**  5.13**  5.95**  41.38**  3.9  4.54**  2.74 
Chhattisgarh  ALL  4.81  4.15**  3.76**  2.58*  -1.39  1.58  1.32  2.74*  36.29**  4.13**  4.79**  4.52** 
Delhi  ALL  6.75  -0.36  0.08  1.64  8.42  -3.62  -2.64  -0.36  5.33  -0.18  0.15  3.42 
Gujarat  ALL  10.68  -4.05**  -2.5  -3.06**  2.35  0.58  0.51  0.54  32.46  5.47**  5.25**  2.90* 
Haryana  ALL  3.1  3.06  2.8  1.94  -12.12  -2.26  -2.8  -4.07  10.16  2.45  2.82  0.55 
Himachal Pradesh  ALL  -2.04  -2.15  -2.28  -1.36  -16.82**  0.74  -0.82  -1.48  0.37  8.56**  8.37**  8.18** 
Jammu & Kashmir  ALL  -13.91  -0.61  -1.39  -0.74  79.87**  -3.81  1.22  -0.88  22.23  0.7  1.97  4.79 
Jharkhand  ALL  12.52  4.71  4.07*  2.54  86.22**  0.36  4.25**  3.28  -13.38  -1.13  -1.45  -3.43 
Karnataka  ALL  16.09  1.13  1.74  2.38*  -3.07  -0.86  -0.88  -0.79  15.01*  0.06  0.78  1.03 
Kerala  ALL  21.42  5.00  6.27  2.74  -6.64  1.84  1.08  1.69  -2.5  0.32  0.07  -1.98 
Madhya Pradesh  ALL  8.65  3.48**  3.25**  2.65**  22.47*  3.09**  3.44**  2.5  9.75  3.87**  3.62**  2.82 
Maharashtra   ALL  -3.09  0.15  0.03  -0.62  5.68  0.23  0.38  1.22  17.43*  1.32  1.71*  3.10** 
Northeast  ALL  -5.01  2.79  2.12  0.55  29.97  3.85  6.12**  3.25  11.32  1.22  2.1  3.24 
Orissa  ALL  1.23  1.09  0.98  1.4  -0.67  -0.7  -0.63  -0.05  27.69**  4.45**  4.8  3.82** 
Punjab  ALL  7.34  -1  -0.17  2.91  -11.63  9.46**  6.65**  6.85**  21.66  -2.79  -0.36  3.1 
Rajasthan  ALL  24.21*  2.01  2.79  2.04  42.30**  4.35**  5.56**  4.61**  34.13**  6.62**  7.03**  5.86** 
Tamil Nadu  ALL  -19.28  2.04  0.76  -0.26  3.61  -0.71  -0.45  2.83  -4.18  4.12  3.58  6.89 
Uttar Pradesh  ALL  7.99  0.48  0.76  0.58  10.46  -1.03  -0.45  -0.82  11.68  2.74**  2.89**  1.75 
Uttarakhand  ALL  10.80  -10.25*  -9.22  -8.27  0.30  5.56  5.49  4.07  12.48**  3.63  4.56  5.61 
West Bengal  ALL  1.57  -1.42  -1.12  -0.61  14.64  -1.79  -0.63  1.2  21.64**  -1.61  -0.04  1.93 
 Note: [1]. ** statistically significant at 5% level; *statistically significant at 10% level. [2]. The cells display 100*DME; where DME is the difference in coefficients on proportion of male and female 
in that particular age group. [3]. Conditional OLS equation is fitted only for households with positive education spending; the dependent variable is natural log of household education budget share.  
The coefficient on the gender  variable is transformed so that marginal effect reported in col. 2 are comparable to those in col. 4, where the dependent variable is in absolute rather than in log 
terms. Col. 4 pertains to the unconditional OLS of absolute household education budget share fitted to all households, including those  with zero education budget shares. P-value for col. 3 is 




Table 4b: Difference in Marginal Effect (DME) × 100 of Gender Variables by age group (Household Results), Rural 
   Age 5-9  Age 10-14  Age 15-19 
State 
area  Probit     
(1) 
Conditional 





OLS    (4) 
Probit     
(1) 
Conditional 





OLS    (4) 
Probit     
(1) 
Conditional 





OLS    (4) 
All India  Rural  8.96  0.86  1.06**  0.62  14.22**  0.68  1.12**  1.85**  23.31**  2.91**  3.31**  3.09** 
Andhra Pradesh  Rural  14.70  0.59  1.05  1.70  -0.64  -1.28  -1.11  0.42  14.42  3.87*  3.81**  3.20 
Assam  Rural  9.65  -0.26  0.03  -1.46  -67.25**  0.97  -0.80  1.35  22.36  -2.11  -0.93  -1.09 
Bihar  Rural  -5.34  -1.50  -1.34  -0.68  55.21**  3.93**  4.88**  6.09**  42.20*  5.19*  5.43**  3.64 
Chhattisgarh  Rural  16.84  4.66**  4.51**  3.19**  -2.77  1.37  1.11  2.66  38.83**  4.25**  4.77**  4.13** 
Gujarat  Rural  11.42  -3.67*  -2.18  -2.98*  -4.79  0.06  -0.10  0.61  61.58**  6.60**  6.28**  2.93 
Haryana  Rural  21.11  5.68*  6.15*  4.34*  -6.93  -1.36  -1.59  -2.79  9.53  2.48  2.71  -0.04 
Himachal Pradesh  Rural  -4.62  -2.12  -2.47  -1.77  -15.67*  1.37  -0.04  -0.98  -0.82  8.52**  8.25**  8.88* 
Jammu & Kashmir  Rural  -32.99  -1.02  -2.72  -4.99  88.97**  -4.68  0.36  -2.38  18.81  0.67  1.63  7.22* 
Jharkhand  Rural  -3.30  4.52  2.96  1.43  116.94**  -0.65  4.30  4.24  -24.64  -0.52  -1.36  -4.57 
Karnataka  Rural  12.53  0.02  0.51  0.90  -11.79  -0.70  -1.03  -0.90  19.39  0.51  1.17  0.65 
Kerala  Rural  16.57  9.09  9.82*  5.18  -14.09  1.33  -0.04  1.88  -2.85  0.35  0.07  -4.86 
Madhya Pradesh  Rural  18.64  2.61**  2.74**  2.79**  30.36*  3.36**  3.73**  4.15**  28.71**  4.94**  4.98**  5.95** 
Maharashtra  Rural  -3.18  0.00  -0.06  -0.47  -5.20  0.05  -0.07  0.78  16.64  0.97  1.17  3.07** 
Orissa  Rural  -0.19  1.09  0.93  1.36  -3.21  -0.63  -0.64  -0.21  39.90**  4.98**  5.51**  5.11** 
Punjab  Rural  7.88  -0.20  0.41  3.09  -5.55  9.13**  7.58**  9.23**  15.94  -3.54  -1.91  1.19 
Rajasthan  Rural  28.88*  2.46  3.14**  2.38*  57.75**  4.93**  6.29**  5.53**  48.24**  9.07**  9.22**  8.11** 
Tamil Nadu  Rural  -14.08  9.44**  8.13  2.54  8.77  -0.18  0.27  5.11  -3.05  7.40  6.77**  10.78 
Uttar Pradesh  Rural  13.27  0.12  0.57  0.08  3.76  0.10  0.22  0.63  15.68  3.67**  3.75**  3.72** 
West Bengal  Rural  -1.34  -1.42  -1.27  -0.80  2.98  -2.63  -2.07  -1.15  32.81**  -3.27  -1.04  -0.63 
 Note: [1]. ** statistically significant at 5% level; *statistically significant at 10% level. [2]. The cells display 100*DME; where DME is the difference in coefficients on proportion of male and female 
in that particular age group. [3]. Conditional OLS equation is fitted only for households with positive education spending; the dependent variable is natural log of household education budget share.  
The coefficient on the gender  variable is transformed so that marginal effect reported in col. 2 are comparable to those in col. 4, where the dependent variable is in absolute rather than in log 
terms. Col. 4 pertains to the unconditional OLS of absolute household education budget share fitted to all households, including those with zero education budget shares. P-value for col. 3 is 
obtained by bootstrapping with 100 replications. [4]. For Delhi only ALL is reported, as it is predominantly urban. In case of Northeast and Uttarakhand, only results from pooled sample reported 
because of restricted sample size. 







Table 4c: Difference in Marginal Effect (DME) × 100 of Gender Variables by age group (Household Results), Urban  
   Age 5-9  Age 10-14  Age 15-19 
State 
area  Probit     
(1) 
Conditional 





OLS    (4) 
Probit     
(1) 
Conditional 





OLS    (4) 
Probit     
(1) 
Conditional 





OLS    (4) 
All India  Urban  -0.45  1.24  1.05  1.26  12.97**  0.48  1.36  1.15  6.39*  1.06  1.40*  2.90** 
Andhra Pradesh  Urban  -22.88  4.93  3.05  6.09**  15.41  2.67  3.62  3.31  3.42  8.84**  8.63**  8.56** 
Assam  Urban  -13.00  -3.38  -3.67  -3.06  23.05  0.08  0.87  -0.77  18.87  2.18  2.72  0.73 
Bihar  Urban  20.08  0.52  1.80  1.13  2.77  4.04  3.92  2.79  34.22**  -5.10  -2.46  -2.83 
Chhattisgarh  Urban  -38.42  -0.25  -2.58  2.93  15.52  -2.63  -1.41  0.55  26.44  -0.55  1.13  5.81 
Gujarat  Urban  3.89  -4.46  -3.26  -2.38  14.20  1.92  2.45  -0.09  5.77  3.47  3.11  2.25 
Haryana  Urban  -27.33  -6.99  -9.44  -1.49  -41.03  -6.79  -10.84  -9.72  -7.29  3.78  2.58  -0.65 
Himachal Pradesh  Urban  0.00  -2.41  -2.41  3.32  -0.00**  -10.99  -10.99  -7.78  0.00  8.08  8.08  6.34 
Jammu & Kashmir  Urban  22.30  1.42  3.35  8.88  0.28  3.65  3.43  3.94  17.97  0.21  1.83  -0.65 
Jharkhand  Urban  27.71  17.62**  20.02**  15.64**  -22.56  10.48  7.58  4.16  5.02  0.38  0.93  -1.60 
Karnataka  Urban  18.83  5.74*  6.58**  4.69**  3.51  -2.69  -2.23  -1.46  3.86  -1.30  -0.93  1.68 
Kerala  Urban  42.51*  -6.57  -2.64  -3.23  10.33  2.66  2.99  -0.03  10.17  1.64  2.11  9.22 
Madhya Pradesh  Urban  -11.77  6.90  5.45  3.86  11.70  3.31  3.69  0.55  -32.04**  -2.87  -4.54  -4.60 
Maharashtra  Urban  -2.08  -0.03  -0.14  -1.74  25.52  -0.10  1.32  1.89  20.62*  0.93  1.99  4.18 
Orissa  Urban  8.17  2.50  2.81  2.24  11.86  -0.02  0.75  1.44  -10.79  0.47  -0.27  -2.58 
Punjab  Urban  9.58  -7.66  -4.21  2.04  -25.94  6.55  1.52  -0.45  31.87  2.26  5.30  7.39 
Rajasthan  Urban  3.95  3.70  3.54  1.61  4.35  0.83  1.06  1.90  -7.85  -4.18  -4.27  -2.73 
Tamil Nadu  Urban  -23.67*  -3.51  -4.81  -1.48  -8.29  0.28  -0.28  2.08  -0.61  -0.22  -0.24  3.42 
Uttar Pradesh  Urban  -15.08  5.76*  3.86  2.84  27.08**  -9.74**  -6.41*  -7.13**  8.47  0.63  1.29  -1.20 
West Bengal  Urban  9.12  0.34  1.17  1.31  27.93**  1.30  3.83  6.19**  0.19  4.19  3.84  6.43* 
 Note: [1]. ** statistically significant at 5% level; *statistically significant at 10% level. [2]. The cells display 100*DME; where DME is the difference in coefficients on proportion of male and female 
in that particular age group. [3]. Conditional OLS equation is fitted only for households with positive education spending; the dependent variable is natural log of household education budget share.  
The coefficient on the gender  variable is transformed so that marginal effect reported in col. 2 are comparable to those in col. 4, where the dependent variable is in absolute rather than in log 
terms. Col. 4 pertains to the unconditional OLS of absolute household education budget share fitted to all households, including those with zero education budget shares. P-value for col. 3 is 
obtained by bootstrapping with 100 replications. [4]. For Delhi only ALL is reported, as it is predominantly urban. In case of Northeast and Uttarakhand, only results from pooled sample reported 
because of restricted sample size. 






Table 5a: Marginal Effect of the Male Dummy Variable (Individual-level data), All (Urban + Rural) 
  
   Age 5-9  Age 10-14  Age 15-19 
state  area  Probit     
(1) 
Conditiona





l OLS    (4) 
Probit     
(1) 
Conditiona





l OLS    (4) 
Probit     
(1) 
Conditiona





l OLS    (4) 
All India  ALL  0.02**  0.10**  0.09**  0.12**  0.05**  0.08**  0.10  0.13**  0.12**  0.07**  0.11**  0.13** 
Andhra Pradesh  ALL  0.03  0.26**  0.24**  0.23**  0.04**  -0.02  0.02  0.04  0.18**  -0.13  0.11**  0.14** 
Assam  ALL  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.06  -0.04  0.05  0.00  0.26**  -0.07  -0.11  -0.09*  -0.15 
Bihar  ALL  0.03  0.10  0.08  0.03  0.15**  0.28**  0.33**  0.30**  0.13**  0.31**  0.19**  0.23** 
Chhattisgarh  ALL  0.01  0.20**  0.14**  0.29**  0.06*  0.09  0.12**  0.21**  0.27**  -0.04  0.12**  0.32** 
Delhi  ALL  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.25**  0.00  0.00  0.01  -0.02  0.01  0.06  0.04  0.05 
Gujarat  ALL  0.04  -0.04  0.00  0.13  0.04  0.11  0.12**  0.10  0.17**  -0.09  0.10**  0.15** 
Haryana  ALL  0.02  0.12**  0.11**  0.08  0.00  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.14**  0.10  0.16**  0.17** 
Himachal Pradesh  ALL  0.01  0.04  0.04  0.04  -0.01  0.10**  0.09**  0.15**  0.01  0.20**  0.15**  0.28** 
Jammu & Kashmir  ALL  0.03  0.03  0.05  -0.02  0.03  0.14  0.15  0.20**  0.09  0.06  0.12  0.10 
Jharkhand  ALL  -0.01  0.1  0.05  0.18*  0.12**  0.07  0.11**  0.21**  0.04  0.05  0.03  -0.01 
Karnataka  ALL  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.18**  0.01  0.05  0.05  0.07  0.08**  0.11*  0.11**  0.10** 
Kerala  ALL  -0.05  0.16  0.07  0.07  0.00  0.08  0.09  0.13  0.00  -0.09  -0.06  -0.08 
Madhya Pradesh  ALL  0.03  0.18**  0.14**  0.03  0.08**  0.24**  0.25**  0.21**  0.16**  0.22**  0.21**  0.18** 
Maharashtra  ALL  -0.03  -0.03  -0.04  0.04  0.05**  0.01  0.04  0.04  0.08**  0.13**  0.13**  0.20** 
Northeast  ALL  -0.05  0.14  0.08  0.13  0.02  -0.02  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.09  0.08  0.09 
Orissa  ALL  0.04  0.10*  0.11**  0.17*  0.05  0.06  0.08**  0.07  0.07**  -0.20  0.02  0.00 
Punjab  ALL  -0.02  0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.05*  0.15**  0.17**  0.22**  -0.03  0.04  -0.01  0.00 
Rajasthan  ALL  0.11**  0.13**  0.18**  0.20**  0.15**  0.22**  0.30**  0.28**  0.20**  0.26**  0.23**  0.20** 
Tamil Nadu  ALL  -0.02  0.11  0.08  0.14  0.01  -0.14**  -0.12**  -0.11  0.18**  -0.05  0.11**  0.18* 
Uttar Pradesh  ALL  0.03  0.18**  0.16**  0.20**  0.03*  0.11**  0.12**  0.20**  0.15**  0.19**  0.17**  0.22** 
Uttarakhand  ALL  -0.02  0.00  -0.01  -0.11  0.02  0.25**  0.26**  0.25**  0.12  0.07  0.13*  -0.03 
West Bengal  ALL  0.05*  0.07  0.09**  0.07  0.00  0.04  0.04  0.13**  0.08**  0.02  0.05**  0.06* 
Note: [1]. ** statistically significant at 5% level; *statistically significant at 10% level. [2]. The cells show the marginal effect of gender dummy variable (Male). In col. 2, 3, and 4, the marginal effect 
of gender dummy variable is divided by average expenditure per enrolled child in that state-area (Rural/Urban/ALL). [3]. For combined probit+ OLS models, the P-values were obtained from 
bootstrapping with 100 replications. [4]. The conditional OLS is fitted only for children with positive education spending, and the dependent variable is log of education spending. The coefficient of 
gender dummy variable were transformed so that the marginal effects reported in col. 2 are comparable to col. 4, where the dependent  variable is in absolute term rather than in log terms. Col. 4 
pertains to unconditional OLS of absolute education expenditure, fitted on all children, including those with zero education expenditure. 
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Table 5b: Marginal Effect of the Male Dummy Variable (Individual-level data), Rural 
  
   Age 5-9  Age 10-14  Age 15-19 
state  area  Probit     
(1) 
Conditional 





OLS    (4) 
Probit     
(1) 
Conditional 





OLS    (4) 
Probit     
(1) 
Conditional 





OLS    (4) 
All India  Rural  0.03**  0.13**  0.11  0.13**  0.06**  0.10**  0.13  0.17**  0.15**  0.08**  0.14**  0.15** 
Andhra Pradesh  Rural  0.05  0.21**  0.21**  0.27**  0.06**  -0.06  0.00  0.04  0.22**  -0.32*  0.12**  0.11 
Assam  Rural  0.00  0.03  0.02  0.07  -0.07  0.03  -0.04  0.15  -0.06  -0.20  -0.12  -0.14 
Bihar  Rural  0.04  0.10  0.09**  0.04  0.17**  0.32**  0.38**  0.32**  0.14**  0.41**  0.22**  0.31** 
Chhattisgarh  Rural  0.03  0.29**  0.21**  0.15*  0.05  0.11  0.15**  0.14**  0.28**  -0.28  0.20**  0.17* 
Gujarat  Rural  0.05  -0.12  -0.04  0.01  0.06*  0.21**  0.23**  0.25**  0.19**  -0.34  0.14**  0.22** 
Haryana  Rural  0.03  0.20**  0.18**  0.13  0.01  0.05  0.05  -0.01  0.13**  0.15  0.19**  0.23** 
Himachal Pradesh  Rural  0.01  0.03  0.03**  0.04  -0.01  0.11**  0.10**  0.21**  0.00  0.20**  0.14**  0.28** 
Jammu & Kashmir  Rural  0.02  0.05  0.06  0.00  0.03  0.13  0.15**  0.18  0.08  0.01  0.09**  0.09 
Jharkhand  Rural  -0.03  0.17*  0.08**  0.10  0.12**  0.07  0.12**  0.25  0.02  0.03  0.02**  -0.05 
Karnataka  Rural  0.02  -0.02  0.01  0.06  0.03  0.05  0.07**  0.04  0.11**  0.13  0.16**  0.18** 
Kerala  Rural  -0.08  0.22  0.08  0.16  0.00  0.06  0.07  0.10  -0.03  -0.14  -0.12*  -0.15 
Madhya Pradesh  Rural  0.05*  0.26**  0.21**  0.09  0.08**  0.31**  0.33**  0.32**  0.23**  0.30**  0.30**  0.37** 
Maharashtra  Rural  -0.06  -0.08  -0.12**  -0.09  0.06**  0.01  0.07  0.10*  0.13**  0.16*  0.20**  0.29** 
Orissa  Rural  0.05  0.09  0.11**  0.16  0.06*  0.05  0.09*  0.07  0.08**  -0.33  0.04**  0.07 
Punjab  Rural  -0.02  0.03  0.01  0.08  0.07**  0.14*  0.19**  0.22**  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02 
Rajasthan  Rural  0.12**  0.13*  0.20**  0.26**  0.18**  0.29**  0.39**  0.37**  0.22**  0.39**  0.31**  0.33** 
Tamil Nadu  Rural  0.03  0.26*  0.22  0.30  0.03  -0.19*  -0.14  -0.20  0.25*  -0.07  0.19  0.24 
Uttar Pradesh  Rural  0.03  0.24**  0.21**  0.26**  0.04**  0.15**  0.16**  0.32**  0.19**  0.28**  0.24**  0.31** 
West Bengal  Rural  0.04  0.13  0.14**  0.00  -0.01  0.04  0.02  0.10  0.08**  0.01  0.06**  0.03 
Note: [1]. ** statistically significant at 5% level; *statistically significant at 10% level. [2]. The cells show the marginal effect of gender dummy variable (Male). In col. 2, 3, and 4, the marginal effect 
of gender dummy variable is divided by average expenditure per enrolled child in that state-area (Rural/Urban/ALL). [3]. For combined probit+ OLS models, the P-values were obtained from 
bootstrapping with 100 replications. [4]. The conditional OLS is fitted only for children with positive education spending, and the dependent variable is log of education spending. The coefficient of 
gender dummy variable were transformed so that the marginal effects reported in col. 2 are comparable to col. 4, where the dependent  variable is in absolute term rather than in log terms. Col. 4 
pertains to unconditional OLS of absolute education expenditure, fitted on all children, including those with zero education expenditure. [5]. For Delhi only ALL is reported, as it is predominantly 







Table 5c: Marginal Effect of the Male Dummy Variable (Individual-level data), Urban 
  
   Age 5-9  Age 10-14  Age 15-19 
state  area  Probit     
(1) 
Conditiona





l OLS    (4) 
Probit     
(1) 
Conditiona





l OLS    (4) 
Probit     
(1) 
Conditiona





l OLS    (4) 
All India  Urban  0.00  0.11**  0.09**  0.12**  0.02**  0.06**  0.07**  0.08**  0.04**  0.07**  0.06**  0.11** 
Andhra Pradesh  Urban  -0.01  0.49**  0.45**  0.20**  0.00  0.15*  0.14  0.04  0.04  0.15  0.10*  0.18** 
Assam  Urban  0.08  -0.28  -0.18  -0.02  0.08  0.21  0.25  0.49**  -0.13*  0.03  -0.08  -0.23 
Bihar  Urban  0.00  0.10  0.07  0.02  0.02  0.15*  0.14**  0.15  0.05  -0.08  0.02  0.02 
Chhattisgarh  Urban  -0.11  0.47**  0.29  0.48**  0.10*  0.00  0.07  0.22  0.15  0.24  0.26**  0.57** 
Gujarat  Urban  0.00  0.06  0.05  0.18  -0.02  -0.04  -0.05  -0.03  0.13**  -0.03  0.09*  0.15 
Haryana  Urban  0.00  -0.04  -0.04  -0.03  -0.01  0.07  0.06  0.02  0.15  0.13  0.21*  0.17 
Jharkhand  Urban  0.17**  0.09  0.20**  0.32**  0.06*  0.21*  0.24**  0.14  0.15**  0.19*  0.26**  0.25** 
Kerala  Urban  0.02  0.05  0.05  -0.12  0.00  0.11  0.11  0.18  0.09  0.01  0.08  0.14 
Karnataka  Urban  0.04  0.14*  0.15**  0.22**  -0.03  0.03  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.15*  0.09  0.05 
Madhya Pradesh  Urban  -0.03  0.04  0.01  -0.05  0.04  0.17**  0.17**  0.10  -0.04  0.20*  0.05  -0.02 
Maharashtra  Urban  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.07  0.03*  -0.01  0.02  0.00  0.03  0.13  0.10  0.20** 
Orissa  Urban  0.01  0.27**  0.23**  0.27*  -0.02  0.13*  0.10  0.07  -0.05  0.05  -0.04  -0.17 
Punjab  Urban  -0.03  -0.02  -0.04  -0.09  -0.01  0.22**  0.19**  0.20**  -0.10*  0.08  -0.03  -0.02 
Rajasthan  Urban  0.04  0.19**  0.18**  0.15*  0.02  0.08  0.09  0.12*  0.10**  0.05  0.09**  -0.01 
Tamil Nadu  Urban  -0.08**  0.01  -0.05  0.10  0.00  -0.03  -0.03  0.07  0.10**  -0.05  0.03  0.15 
Uttar Pradesh  Urban  0.01  0.18**  0.15**  0.14*  -0.01  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.09  0.05  0.14** 
West Bengal  Urban  0.09**  0.05  0.10  0.22  0.06*  0.06  0.10  0.22*  0.05  0.04  0.06  0.12** 
Note: [1]. ** statistically significant at 5% level; *statistically significant at 10% level. [2]. The cells show the marginal effect of gender dummy variable (Male). In col. 2, 3, and 4, the marginal effect 
of gender dummy variable is divided by average expenditure per enrolled child in that state-area (Rural/Urban/ALL). [3]. For combined probit+ OLS models, the P-values were obtained from 
bootstrapping with 100 replications. [4]. The conditional OLS is fitted only for children with positive education spending, and the dependent variable is log of education spending. The coefficient of 
gender dummy variable were transformed so that the marginal effects reported in col. 2 are comparable to col. 4, where the dependent  variable is in absolute term rather than in log terms. Col. 4 
pertains to unconditional OLS of absolute education expenditure, fitted on all children, including those with zero education expenditure. [5]. For Delhi only ALL is reported, as it is predominantly 
urban. In case of Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Northeast, Uttarakhand, results from pooled sample (ALL) is reported because of sample size considerations.     








Table 6: Coefficient of the Male dummy in the individual level equations with family fixed effects 
   Age 5-9  Age 10-14  Age 15-19 
State 
ANYEDUEXP  EDUEXP 
(if>0) 
EDUEXP  ANYEDUEXP  EDUEXP 
(if>0) 




(1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3) 
All India  0.04**  0.15**  0.14**  0.08**  0.15**  0.17**  0.12**  0.39**  0.32** 
Andhra Pradesh  0.02  0.19  0.17  0.10**  0.11  0.15*  0.12**  -0.52*  -0.01 
Assam  0.03  -0.06  0.01  0.08  -0.02  -0.01  0.04  -0.05  0.03 
Bihar  0.15**  -0.07  0.28  0.20**  0.18  0.37**  0.05  0.07  0.39 
Chhattisgarh  0.04  0.14  0.01  0.08  0.05  0.11  0.25**  4.78  0.93 
Delhi  0.05  0.20  0.35**  0.02  -0.01  0.05  0.07  0.40**  0.33** 
Gujarat  0.03  -0.07  0.01  0.13**  0.27  0.32**  0.15*  3.12*  0.52** 
Haryana  0.06  0.10*  0.10*  0.04  0.14**  0.12**  0.17**  0.12  0.42** 
Himachal Pradesh  0.00  0.11*  0.14*  -0.02  0.16  0.12  0.04  0.04  0.12 
Jammu & Kashmir  -0.01  -0.06  -0.07  0.10**  0.11  0.21**  0.03  0.57*  0.40** 
Jharkhand  -0.08  0.45**  0.09  0.03  0.38**  0.44**  0.16**  0.90**  0.51** 
Karnataka  0.04  0.34**  0.21**  0.00  0.01  -0.05  0.08**  -0.32  0.09 
Kerala  -0.17**  -0.05  -0.17  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  1.76  0.68 
Madhya Pradesh  0.07*  -0.04  0.03  0.11**  0.29**  0.29**  0.13**  0.36  0.24 
Maharashtra   -0.03  0.11  0.02  0.05  -0.03  -0.01  0.11**  0.37  0.33** 
Northeast  -0.12**  0.26**  0.22  0.02  0.01  -0.01  0.02  -0.06  -0.07 
Orissa  0.01  0.17  0.12  0.10**  0.18*  0.18**  0.11  -2.58  0.54 
Punjab  0.02  0.12*  0.02  0.07  0.05  0.04  -0.01  0.53  0.10 
Rajasthan  0.10**  0.22**  0.18**  0.15**  0.30**  0.35**  0.17**  1.35**  0.71** 
Tamil Nadu  -0.02  -0.06  -0.11  0.03  -0.05  -0.06  0.31**  -0.44  0.62** 
Uttar Pradesh  0.06**  0.26**  0.30**  0.07**  0.31**  0.27**  0.13**  0.63*  0.35** 
Uttarakhand  0.21**  0.51**  0.42**  0.00  0.13  0.12  0.11  -0.30  -0.21 
West Bengal  0.06  0.07  0.21*  0.03  0.12  0.08  0.04  0.54*  0.26* 
Note: [1]. ** statistically significant at 5% level; *statistically significant at 10% level. [2]. Three individual level equations for each age group are: (1) the probit 
estimation of ANYEDUEXP (whether any positive expenditure was incurred), (2) EDUEXP conditional on ANYEDUEXP==1 , (3) unconditional education expenditure (zeros 
for those who did not spend on education). [3]. Marginal effects of Male dummy is reported. In col. 2 and 3, the marginal effect of gender dummy variable is divided by 
average expenditure per enrolled child in that state (sample include only those households which have both male and female children in that age group). [4]. Age of 




Table 7: Gender difference in school choice, raw, LPM and fixed effect estimates 

































































(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
All India  30.53  5.14**  5.19**  4.95**  24.32  3.85**  4.20**  5.45**  19.55  0.44  2.21**  2.86** 
Andhra Pradesh  40.71  9.83**  10.03**  9.07**  24.27  5.39*  6.64**  5.22**  14.24  0.40  6.25*  3.49 
Assam  5.78  1.85  2.50  0.00  6.19  0.00  -0.47  -1.76  16.67  -4.60  -2.46  0.00 
Bihar  20.75  2.21  1.95  3.38  15.32  -2.37  1.18  3.84  9.81  -4.03  -0.31  7.08 
Chhattisgarh  21.85  4.72  5.96*  6.92  12.00  6.57**  5.88**  6.07*  17.24  -6.05  -5.74  0.11 
Delhi  34.09  2.18  1.34  1.18  24.96  6.62*  3.62  6.27**  20.82  4.47  6.75  8.02 
Gujarat  22.74  1.70  0.34  -0.13  22.75  -0.63  0.07  0.74  23.08  -5.99  -0.69  7.86 
Haryana  56.81  9.97**  7.12**  10.00**  39.41  6.27  4.86  9.05**  37.51  5.04  9.06  0.64 
Himachal Pradesh  26.47  8.49**  2.54  4.70  15.53  8.03**  4.78*  3.09  9.90  6.20**  6.66**  -1.88 
Jammu & Kashmir  45.98  1.34  3.64  -9.76*  44.68  4.92  10.19**  15.74**  17.35  7.76*  4.70  6.30 
Jharkhand  33.61  -0.37  3.05  8.86**  32.26  1.22  2.59  12.77**  24.85  -0.87  -1.47  13.14 
Karnataka  33.20  0.88  2.50  7.49**  25.02  3.89  3.56*  4.31**  23.24  8.09**  8.58**  2.04 
Kerala  40.43  2.25  -0.85  -0.53  23.07  -4.98  -5.18  -1.92  23.19  -1.34  -2.55  -26.05** 
Madhya Pradesh  31.34  5.67**  7.10**  9.51**  25.29  8.13**  8.55**  6.19**  25.90  0.99  8.32**  12.09** 
Maharashtra   18.18  2.58  0.18  2.86  19.36  2.55  2.80  1.64  17.43  -4.39  -1.24  0.67 
Northeast  42.31  -2.70  4.47  9.21**  29.32  -3.54  -1.30  1.03  23.05  5.49  6.36  -12.15* 
Orissa  7.80  1.52  2.00  0.65  8.15  -0.50  0.08  2.06  15.46  -19.69**  -19.59**  -22.38 
Punjab  61.20  5.59  5.14  4.68**  47.96  4.29  7.16*  7.68**  36.10  6.72  6.29  8.50 
Rajasthan  35.87  4.37  7.66**  6.12**  29.73  11.10**  11.16**  8.57**  20.72  -1.42  2.63  8.61 
Tamil Nadu  33.21  6.28  6.10*  1.53  17.53  -5.10  -3.49  3.99  15.16  -4.10  -1.10  -6.64 
Uttar Pradesh  38.12  9.93**  10.43**  4.10**  38.11  8.93**  7.59**  10.38**  24.01  2.20  4.33  1.18 
Uttarakhand  33.98  0.16  4.19  19.47*  21.80  15.90**  12.89**  6.88  19.19  21.24**  19.64**  33.64** 
West Bengal  14.43  1.46  1.45  4.99*  5.81  2.76**  1.65  -0.14  5.47  1.13  1.11  -1.03 
Note: [1]. ** statistically significant at 5% level; *statistically significant at 10% level. [2]. Col. 1 refers to percentage of total enrolled children attending private school; col. 2 report gender difference in private attendance 
among enrolled children. [3]. Col. 3 reports the coefficient on Male dummy from a LPM model fitted in sample of all enrolled children. The controls include age of child, log of monthly per capita (lpce), square of lpce, log of 
household size, head years of education, and dummies for male, head’s occupation, urban, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Other Backward Castes, and Muslim. [4]. Col. 4 reports the coefficient on Male dummy from 




Table A1: OLS regression of budget share of education; binary probit of 
any education expenditure, and OLS regression on natural log  
of budget share of education 
Variable 
 












         
LNPCE  Log of per capita expenditure  0.01  0.31***  1.02*** 
LNPCESQ  Square of LNPCE  0.00  -0.02***  -0.08*** 
LNHHSIZE  Log of household size  0.02***  0.25***  0.06* 
M0to4  Fraction of household’s members in 
---------- male & 0-4 age group    -0.05***  -0.24***  -1.88*** 
M5to9  ---------- male & 5-9 age group  0.02**  0.64***  -0.30* 
M10to14  ---------- male & 10-14 age group  0.05***  0.80***  0.56*** 
M15to19  ---------- male & 15-19 age group  0.06***  0.09  1.41*** 
M20to24  ---------- male & 20-14 age group  -0.03***  -0.37***  -0.26 
M25to60  ---------- male & 25-60 age group  -0.03***  -0.24***  -0.56*** 
M61plus  ---------- male & above 61 age  -0.03***  -0.20**  -0.10 
F0to4  ------- female & 0-4 age group  -0.05***  -0.24***  -1.59*** 
F5to9  ------- female & 5-9 age group  0.01  0.58***  -0.50*** 
F10to14  ------- female & 10-14 age group  0.03***  0.66***  0.41** 
F15to19  ------- female & 15-19 age group  0.03***  -0.09  0.88*** 
F20to24  ------- female & 20-24 age group  -0.01*  -0.15**  -0.58*** 
F25to60  ------- female & 25-60 age group  -0.00  0.16***  -0.07 
FEMALEHEAD  Family head is female  0.00*  -0.01  0.14*** 
HEADYRSEDN  Years of education of head  0.00***  0.01***  0.05*** 
WAGELABOR  Household head is wage laborer  -0.01***  -0.04***  -0.19*** 
SC  Indictor for Scheduled Castes  -0.01***  -0.03***  -0.20*** 
ST  Indictor for Scheduled Tribes  -0.01***  -0.04**  -0.22*** 
OBC  Indictor for Other Backward  Castes  -0.01***  -0.02**  -0.10*** 
MUSLIM  Indicator for Muslim  -0.02***  -0.11***  -0.29*** 
URBAN  Urban residence  0.02***  -0.00  0.54*** 
Constant    -0.04     
Observations    30199  30199  23752 
R-squared    0.21    0.29 
P-Values (M=F):         
Age 5-9    0.06  0.14  0.08 
Age 10-14    0.00  0.00  0.16 
Age 15-19    0.00  0.00  0.00 









Table A2: Annual average education expenditure (Indian Rupees) on enrolled child,  
by type of school 
   Age 5-9  Age 10-14  Age 15-19 
State  Public  Private  Public  Private  Public  Private 
All India  468  2694  880  3170  3027  4747 
Andhra Pradesh  347  2604  705  3949  3861  5432 
Assam  220  1082  544  1996  1522  2931 
Bihar  538  2205  797  2673  2149  3565 
Chhattisgarh  235  1830  370  2054  1988  3521 
Delhi  845  4363  1165  6269  2859  6739 
Gujarat  537  4516  980  4050  3766  7293 
Haryana  838  3759  1161  4946  4465  6603 
Himachal Pradesh  1246  5121  1978  7321  3847  9098 
Jammu & Kashmir  594  2966  1435  4175  4483  6099 
Jharkhand  408  2367  621  3405  2677  3708 
Karnataka  510  4034  751  3810  4043  4123 
Kerala  1238  2834  1705  3826  4494  5017 
Madhya Pradesh  254  1622  390  2234  1224  2926 
Maharashtra, Goa  464  2675  718  2249  2231  3372 
Northeast  1003  4286  1713  4150  3716  4946 
Orissa  377  3028  815  2665  2028  2558 
Punjab  962  4628  1716  5501  5764  6557 
Rajasthan  466  2108  830  3004  2309  6003 
Tamil Nadu  460  4025  687  3647  3388  5579 
Uttar Pradesh  304  1508  792  1823  2630  3089 
Uttarakhand  704  2928  1145  4182  2556  6299 
West Bengal  619  4186  1488  6827  3706  11877 
                  Note: Education expenditure is derived by adding school fees, expenditures on private tuition,  
    books, uniforms, transportation and other materials.   
 